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Abstract 
 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are argued 
to be a significant benefit to the electric utility grid.  
While DERs generate significant benefits to their 
owners and as well as society, the compensation and 
operating structure of the distribution system of most 
utilities is such that DERs result in minimal benefits to 
the distribution system.  As we show, the benefits 
correctly attributed to the distribution company (the 
wires company) are a function of what service (real, 
reactive power) the DER is able to provide, when and 
where, and at what level of certainty the DER is able to 
provide the service.  We introduce the concepts of 
Marginal Cost of Capacity (MCC) and Locational 
Marginal Value (LMV) in the calculation of the value 
of DERs to the distribution system. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The wholesale bulk power (Generation and 
Transmission) market has seen the acceptance of the 
concept of power generation as a Non-Wires 
Alternative (NWA) to transmission take hold since the 
introduction of FERC 1000 [1].  FERC 1000 created a 
form of Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) that is 
intended to be market driven and decentralized in that 
third parties are able to compete to build transmission 
and to propose NWAs to relieve transmission 
congestion or to address specific transmission system 
needs identified by a TSO/RTO.  At the wholesale 
level the NWAs have focused on demand response and 
on both fossil and renewable resources located at 
strategic positions within the transmission system. 
The distribution sector has adopted the vocabulary 
of NWAs with vigor arguing that these alternatives 
provide a breadth of advantages to society through the 
provision of energy, reserves and other ancillary 
services including reactive power compensation, and, 
most importantly, an alternative or delay to expensive 
and lumpy capital investments. 
This paper focuses on identifying the value of 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) to the owner 
operator of the distribution system.  In the context of 
the market within which the distribution system 
operator sees a profit and loss, the value provided by 
the DERs must be measured in terms of achievable 
savings.  These savings consist of avoided costs of 
operation, and, as we demonstrate, most significantly 
(even though less so than many have argued) of 
avoided capital investment. 
We describe a framework and methodology for 
establishing the Value of DERs to the grid that 
addresses the challenges posed by the push for DERs 
as a NWA.  The framework is grounded in engineering 
and economics, draws on parallels from the wholesale 
concepts of locational marginal pricing adapted (i) to 
the distribution network in the context of Distribution 
Locational Marginal Pricing (DLMP) [2] - [7] and (ii) 
for valuing infrastructure investment, and establishes 
two new economic concepts that are key parts of the 
methodology. 
The first is the Marginal Cost of Capacity (MCC) 
which is the methodology for allocating the capital and 
other costs of traditional wires upgrades to locations on 
a distribution system across the hours of the year.  
The second is the Locational Marginal Value 
(LMV) of DERs as a NWA that establishes the value 
of an increment of a generic DER to the grid at each 
location and at each point in time. 
 
2. Background 
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Unlike at the wholesale level where market design 
and oversight of market decisions are the purview of 
the FERC, at the distribution or retail level the decision 
to allow market-based solutions (non-wires solutions) 
belongs to the state legislatures and public service 
commissions.  FERC’s current rulemaking on 
distributed storage and ongoing investigation into 
DERs in the markets make this clear – FERC believes 
it can establish the rules for having DERs participate in 
wholesale markets but that decisions about retail or 
distribution level markets, including DERs as non-
wires assets, are squarely in the domain of state policy. 
Multiple US states have begun to evaluate the 
concept of considering DERs as a NWA to traditional 
distribution system (“grid”) investments.  NY has 
established the “Reforming the Energy Vision” (NY 
REV), which has required the regulated utilities to 
propose tariff based compensation to DERs for the 
value they provide to the grid in terms of avoided cost 
[8].  The NY REV established a tariff based approach 
which is inherently less granular in location and time 
and which makes use of “generic” capacity costs on a 
utility basis as opposed to specific capacity upgrade 
costs on a per feeder basis. 
California does not have a proposed rulemaking or 
tariff as of yet, but has an active working group (WG) 
the Locational Net Benefit Analysis (LNBA) WG 
looking at the value of DERs [9].  The California 
LNBA WG addressed a much larger problem and 
established a framework that attempts to encompass all 
benefits of DERs to society – including reduced energy 
costs, impacts on locational marginal pricing, reduced 
emissions, improved resiliency, etc., locationally.  The 
published work did not address locational benefits on a 
distribution circuit but stopped at the wholesale station 
using LMPs as the basis.  The California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) review commented that 
locational value on the same granularity as PV hosting, 
for instance, was a critical gap.  Subsequent 
unpublished work reportedly addressed the locational 
benefits of DERs on a circuit in terms of circuit 
Ampere capacity (ampacity), but did not include losses 
or voltage effects. 
The Illinois Next Grid legislation has a goal of 
recognizing the Value of DERs to the Grid [10].  Next 
Grid proposes a structure in which DERs would be 
incented or compensated as a NWA through a form of 
a decentralized IRP process. 
Motivations for pursuing DERs as NWA include (i) 
encouraging more distributed resources as a matter of 
policy due to the economic, environmental, and other 
benefits from renewable distributed generation, (ii) 
reducing long term investment in grid assets that are 
regulated assets, the majority of which are built for 
peak load conditions and are underutilized a high 
percentage of the time, and (iii) gaining more 
flexibility in investment decisions against an uncertain 
future need [11]. 
The first principle in determining the Value of 
DERs to the distribution grid in terms of avoided costs 
is that all DER value is locational.  That is because all 
the avoided costs for capacity and voltage are 
investment costs in response to actual or forecast needs 
of the system, which are always based on specific grid 
issues in specific locations.  Even if society were to 
establish that there is an additional value of having 
excess distribution capacity (for example, to prepare 
for a sudden need for electrification of building space 
conditioning or transportation) as insurance against 
sudden load growth, the value of DERs would still be 
locational. 
Recognizing that the value of DERs is and will 
always be locational is critical.  If, for instance, it were 
deemed important to invest in order to have all circuit 
maximum loadings not greater than 75% of capacity 
instead of 90% of capacity, circuits that were already 
loaded below 75% would see no value of DER in terms 
of increasing capacity.  Circuits that were loaded at 
90% would see a greater value than those loaded at 
85% or 80% depending upon the avoided costs of 
providing the additional capacity circuit by circuit. 
On a given circuit, the ability of DERs to avoid 
capacity or voltage costs by providing real or reactive 
power depends very much upon the DER location 
relative to the grid constraint to be addressed.  For 
instance, if a new warehouse is planned in the last half 
mile of a two-mile long circuit such that the first mile 
of the circuit would then be overloaded – DER in the 
first half mile would only help resolve the loading 
issue in the first half mile; it would have no effect 
whatsoever on the loading issue in the second half 
mile. 
For radial distribution circuits (the most common 
structure in most instances) DERs must be downstream 
of the location of a loading issue in order to help 
mitigate the problem.  This is true in general.  Figure 1 
illustrates this concept through a simple example. 
 
 Figure 1. Illustration of DER overload 
mitigation 
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Similarly, voltage problems on circuits are typically 
local in nature.  Low voltage at the end of the circuit 
does not imply low voltage near or at the station.  
Indeed, attempting to cure the low voltage at one 
location by raising overall circuit voltages may cause 
too high a voltage in another location.  Traditional 
mitigations to voltage issues are to deploy local 
apparatus that affects voltage locally, such as 
capacitors or voltage regulators.  Controlling flicker is 
more difficult as capacitors and voltage regulators are 
not designed for rapid or frequent operation, so static 
VAR compensators or local DERs capable of varying 
real and reactive quickly are required, or alternatively 
the circuit must be re-engineered to decrease its 
impedance and thus the sensitivity of circuit voltages 
to changing PV output. 
If we examine the hypothetical case where the first 
mile of a circuit needs to be reinforced and the 
argument that a generic DER only affects loadings on 
the upstream portions of the circuit, then this 
introduces the concept of how to place a locational 
value on the DER.  If the DER midway on the 
overloaded portion of the circuit deferred the need to 
upgrade capacity on the first half of the circuit – 
conceivably it could at maximum avoid half of the 
cost.  The DER located at the downstream end of the 
affected portion of the circuit could, by contrast, avoid 
all the cost.  So conceptually, the second DER is worth 
twice what the first DER is in terms of Value to the 
Grid. 
This concept can be generalized.  For any DER, its 
locational value is affected by the sensitivity of the 
circuit condition requiring capacity or voltage 
investments to the real and reactive power from that 
DER. 
A third concept is important when we evaluate the 
Value to the Grid of specific DER technologies.  
Circuit capacity and voltage problems typically do not 
happen to the same extent across every hour of the 
year, and in fact may only occur for a limited number 
of hours a year.  The DER technology must be able to 
provide real and reactive power when they are needed 
as well as where they are needed; thus, DER value is 
locational in time and in space. 
In summary, there are three elements to valuing 
DERs.  First is the avoided cost of required circuit 
upgrades and how that cost is apportioned among 
affected parts of the circuit.  Second is how effective 
real and reactive power input from the DERs is at a 
given location of reducing or avoiding that cost.  Third 
is how different DER technologies align with the 
temporal value of DERs and how much of the generic 
DER value a given technology can realize. 
 
3. Desired Features of DER Value to the 
Grid Methodology 
 
The methodology proposed for determining the 
DER value to the grid should be efficient, accurate, and 
fair. Efficiency denotes maximizing the flexibility of 
the system and further deferring large investments to 
accommodate for changes in load [12].  As for 
accuracy, DERs should be compensated for services 
they provide to the distribution grid by addressing 
different characteristics and capabilities of different 
DER technologies as well as addressing differences in 
locational and temporal value of DERs.  An equitable 
and fair methodology limits impact to non-
participating customers and avoids under and over-
compensation.  It further avoids double counting when 
some sources of DER value are compensated 
elsewhere, and supports the penetration of DERs that 
can provide value. 
A simple connectivity analysis could be developed 
to assess the value of DERs for avoiding ampacity 
upgrades, if losses and other factors were ignored.  
However, we are concerned with capacity increases in 
a 10-20% range, never a doubling or more.  
Distribution losses are of the order of 6%, spread 
among secondary transformers, high voltage 
conductors, and station transformers.  Depending upon 
the DER location, it may garner capacity relief in 
addition to its own capacity by reducing losses and 
thus reducing demand upon upstream conductors and 
station transformers.  Behind the meter DERs 
connected on the secondary would also relieve 
secondary transformer losses. 
Additionally, circuit power factors vary widely by 
time of day and location.  Typical circuit power factors 
might be in the range of 95%.  If DER VAR 
withdrawal and injection can be used to obtain near 
100% power factor on a dynamic basis, then an 
additional 4-5% of ampacity can be freed up to deliver 
power.  This is not insignificant. 
Finally, managing circuit voltage levels is also 
important and a source of capacity upgrades.  Some, 
such as adding capacitor banks, are fairly inexpensive.  
But if high voltages due to high PV penetration or high 
flicker levels are the issue, mitigation can be more 
expensive.  DERs with smart inverters offer a lower 
cost approach, possibly.  So the Value of DERs needs 
to consider controlled VAR injection and withdrawal. 
It would be possible to develop approximations to 
each of these three issues – average loss factors can be 
used, average power factor improvement assumed, and 
a cost of traditional VAR management as with an SVC 
(Static VAR Compensator) used as a local proxy for 
the DER Value.  But the three issues interact, and 
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voltage / power factor issues are very locational.  A 
framework rooted in full AC analysis that reflects the 
interaction of the multiple effects is ultimately a better 
approach. 
There are two key concepts to explain before 
describing the methodology. 
The first, the Marginal Cost of Capacity (MCC), is 
the allocation of specific traditional circuit upgrade 
costs to each section and node on the circuit pro rata 
the amount spent on each and the severity of the 
driving condition on each.  For instance, if a circuit 
reconductoring is required on the first 10 sections of a 
circuit with 20 sections, the allocation of the 
reconductoring cost is determined by the relative 
length of each section and by the amount of overload 
on each section at each hour.  The section closest to the 
substation will have the greatest overloads and the 
greatest MCC allocated. 
The second, the Locational Marginal Value (LMV), 
is the incremental value of a kW or kVAR at each node 
in reducing the overloads, over or under voltages, etc., 
that cause the MCC.  Thus each node has LMV 
assigned reflecting the value of an incremental kW or 
kVAR at that node in affecting all circuit conditions 
linked to an MCC. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of LMVs for both 
real (P-LMV) and reactive power (Q-LMV) in a 
congested feeder (congested lines are shown in red).  
LMVs increase as we move down along the feeder; the 
higher the congestion relieved upstream, the higher the 
value. 
 
 Figure 2. Illustration of LMVs in a congested 
feeder 
 
4. Methodology 
 
The proposed methodology consists of 3 steps.  
Step 1 is a preprocessing step, which calculates the 
constraint violation overload and the MCC.  Step 2 is a 
pricing step, which derives the kW and kVAR LMVs 
for each time period and location.  Step 3 is a 
procurement step, which derives the optimal addition 
of generic DERs required to relieve the overload. 
For the purposes of this work, we use the branch 
flow model [13], [14] for a radial distribution network, 
which is presented in Appendix A.  We note, however, 
that meshed networks are likely to appear more 
frequently in the future.  Hence, we plan to extend our 
work to study meshed networks as well, based on 
approaches such as [15].  In the following subsections, 
we elaborate on each step of the methodology. 
 
4.1. Preprocessing 
 
The amount of overload is calculated for each hour 
of the anticipated yearly load profile.  The (squared) 
magnitude of the current, ,ij tl , is derived by solving the 
branch flow model (listed in Appendix A).  More 
specifically, ampacity constraint (A.6) is omitted and 
the following OPF problem is solved: 
 
 OPF-pre: (A.1), s.t. (A.2) – (A.5), (1) 
 
which is a Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP) 
problem because of (A.4). 
Solving OPF-pre, the optimal values of ,ij tl  are 
derived and used to calculate the hourly overload 
 max, ,iˆj t ij t ijI l I     in Amps for each line segment 
( ,i j ) exceeding its ampacity, where we define 
( ) max{0, }x x  . 
The MCC is calculated from the best grid 
investment cost, C , which is obtained by a traditional 
wire solutions planning problem.  We consider two 
cases. 
In the first case, the project cost can be allocated to 
each line segment, e.g., a case of line upgrades.  Let ijc  
be the cost for increasing line ampacity by maxijI  (in 
Amps), with ( , ) iji j c C , and ijT  the number of 
hours the line upgrade is required within the year, i.e., 
the number of hours that the line is overloaded.  We 
annualize ijc  to equal its anticipated impact on the rate 
base; in this work, we scale by a .  MCC overload 
penalty ijw  is then defined as: 
 
 max ,ijij
ij ij
a c
w
I T
    (2) 
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where the MCC is measured in $ per Amp of new 
capacity per (overloaded) hour, for a yearly period of 
one year. 
In the second case, the investment cannot be 
allocated directly to the overloaded lines, e.g., the 
building of new lines as part of a reconfiguration 
scheme.  Nevertheless, we can allocate the project cost 
to the overloaded lines, taking into account their 
maximum overload,  max ,ˆ ˆmaxij ij ttI I   , and length 
ijL , as follows: 
 
 
max
max
( , )
ˆ
ˆ
ij ij
ij
ij iji j
I L C
c
I L
  . (3) 
 
MCC can be derived by (2) using the calculated 
value maxiˆjI instead of the actual increase in ampacity 
max
ijI  that results from the line upgrade. 
 
4.2. Pricing 
 
In this step we derive the DER LMVs.  Penalizing 
the overload ,ij tI  by the MCC ( ijw ), the objective 
function becomes: 
 
 
0 0
0 0, , , , , , ( , )
i ,m n
ij ij i ij ij
P Q
ij ijP Q P Q l I
i j
c P c Q w I      (4) 
 
where we omitted the time index for brevity.  ijI  
represents a new variable introduced for each 
overloaded line, so that the related penalties are only 
applied to ( ,i j ) with 0ijI   during a specific hour.  
Since the load flow solution is known from the 
previous step (we denote the known solution of the 
squared magnitude of the current by 0ijl ), we define the 
overload variable ijI  using the 1st order Taylor 
approximation as follows: 
 
 0 max0
1
2
1 .2ij ij ij ij
ij
I l l I
l
    (5) 
 
The penalty for the overload in the objective 
function represents the annualized pro-rated cost of the 
line, since we penalize only for the amount of new 
capacity needed in each hour, ijI , instead of the 
maximum new capacity of the line max( )ijI . 
We can also consider alternative approaches, for 
instance, the Net Present Value of the annual revenue 
requirement of the capacity upgrade over an 
appropriate planning horizon.  Our framework is 
applicable to alternative approaches, and in fact, the 
subject of policy choices.  A key benefit of the 
marginal nature of our methodology is that the 
inclusion of the marginal avoided cost in the penalty 
wij results in the DER investor and the customers 
sharing the avoided cost.  If the entire avoided cost of 
planned traditional investments, including excess 
capacity, were included in the penalty, then all of the 
avoided cost could be captured by the generic DERs 
via the LMV mechanism.  In such a case customers 
and ratepayers would realize no net savings. 
For each hour in which overload was identified in 
the preprocessing step, the following optimization 
problem is solved: 
 
 OPF-pricing: (4), s.t. (A.2) – (A.5), and (5). (6) 
 
This is also an SOCP problem, and the LMVs are 
obtained as the shadow prices of constraints (A.2a) and 
(A.2b), i.e., ,j jP Q  .  We refer to them as P-LMV and 
Q-LMV, respectively. 
 
4.3. Procurement 
 
In this step, we aim at deriving an optimal 
additional DER procurement that alleviates overload.  
Variables DER, 0j tP  , and DER,j tQ  represent real and 
reactive power procured from generic DERs at node 
j , time period t , at a cost equal to P-LMV and Q-
LMV, respectively as estimated in the pricing step.  
The new objective function is defined by 
  
0 0 DER DER
DER DER
0 0, , , ,
, , ,
min ,
ij ij
i ij j j
P Q P Q
j j j jP Q P
j N
Q
Q
l P
c P c Q P Q

 
 
  
 (7) 
 
where the time index t is omitted for brevity.  Note that 
,P Qj j   are parameters in this step, whose values are 
obtained from the previous step.  Power balance 
constraints (A.2.a)–(A.2.b) are modified accordingly: 
 
D R
:
E 0, ,i jj ij ij j jk
k j k
P l r P P j NP 

        (8.a) 
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DE
:
R .0,jij ij ij j jk
k j k
Q l x Q Q j NQ 

        (8.b) 
 
Network constraints, such as service transformer 
rated capacities, may impose bounds on the real and 
reactive power quantities that can be procured by 
DERs at a certain node (and time period): 
 
 DER DER , ,j j NP P j    (9.a) 
 
 DER DER DER , .j j jQ Q j NQ       (9.b) 
 
The optimal DER allocation is obtained by solving 
the following optimization problem, which is also an 
SOCP: 
 
 DER-opt: (7), s.t. (A.3) – (A.6), (8), and (9). (10) 
 
The solution of (10) provides an estimate of the 
DER quantities required to satisfy the ampacity 
constraints at a minimal procurement cost.  In the 
absence of bound constraints (9), the solution of (10) is 
a lower bound on the DER procurement cost.  
Including constraints (9), we get a more realistic 
estimate of the DER procurement cost.  An advantage 
of the proposed optimal DER procurement is that all 
network constraints are observed eliminating the 
potential of excessive DER additions at one or more 
locations introducing new problems in back flow, high 
voltage, etc. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
A key objective of the proposed methodology has 
been to enable the planner to rely on information which 
is in its planning province.  More specifically, the 
determination of the best grid investment alternative 
and its cost is within the utility’s domain and expertise.  
For instance, the planner should not have to make 
assumptions about the costs of new DERs that 
hypothetically could be procured or incented to be 
developed, in order to relieve constraints and achieve 
feasibility. 
In many cases the best wires alternative may be too 
“large” or too “lumpy” to be economic when DER 
investment alternatives are considered; this becomes an 
issue.  In other words, if the full cost of a large 
investment justified by economies of scale and higher 
future capacity were to be used to derive the Value of 
DERs, then DERs would be overvalued by 
unjustifiably high overload penalties. 
In our proposed methodology there are two distinct 
remedies.  First, the cost of the investment is 
annualized, i.e., the wires investment cost is translated 
to its annual impact on the rate base.  Second, its cost 
is pro-rated to the capacity that load growth indicates 
will be required during the next year or the relevant 
planning horizon. 
Annualizing and pro-rating introduces the notion of 
the MCC.  We use this notion in the valuation of 
generic DERs that are in fact invariant of actual DER 
costs and capabilities.  Reliance on current or future 
DER capabilities and costs or uncertain forecasts of 
multiyear load growth that are particularly risky when 
location is considered as well. 
The LMV provides a valuation of a “generic” DER 
at each node.  As the LMV has a unique value by hour 
of the year, it provides a mechanism to further 
determine the value of a specific DER technology by 
comparing the profile of that technology against the 
profile of the LMV.  Different technologies will “fit” 
the problem to varying degrees and have technology 
specific values.  Some technologies may actually 
aggravate the problem (such as additional PV beyond 
hosting capacity) and would show negative values.  Q-
LMV, the value of kVAR, can take positive or negative 
values depending upon whether reactive power should 
be injected or withdrawn at a given location and hour. 
 
6. Appendix A: Branch Flow Model 
 
We consider graph ( , )N E  representing a radial 
distribution network, where {0,1,..., }N n  is the set 
of nodes (node 0 is the root), \ {0}N N  , and E  is 
the set of edges, denoted by pairs ( , )i j , i.e., lines that 
connect nodes i  and j , ordered by the j -th node.  
The radial structure allows a unique path from root 
node 0 to node j , in which node i  is the node 
preceding j  in this path. 
For each node i N , iV  is the magnitude of the 
voltage, 2i iV  , and miniV  ( maxiV ) is minimum 
(maximum) voltage limit.  For each line ( , )i j , ijr  is 
the resistance, ijx  the reactance, ijI  the magnitude of 
the current, with 2ij ijl I , maxijI the ampacity, and ijP  
and ijQ  the sending-end real and reactive power flow, 
respectively.  iP  and iQ  are the net real and reactive 
injections at node i .  A positive (negative) value of iP  
refers to generation (consumption); similarly for the 
reactive power. 
Figure A.1 shows a representation of a tree network.  
Note that 0 01P P  and 0 01Q Q , and hence variables 
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0 0, ,P Q  can be obtained from the balance in the root 
node. 
 
0 0,P Q
i j
k
ijl
,ij ijP Q
,jk jkP Q
,j jP Q
01 01,P Q
0 1
0 1
01l
jkl
i j
k
 Figure 3. Tree network representation 
 
The branch flow model is presented below. It is 
based on the DistFlow equations introduced in [13] and 
revised in [14].  This model simplifies conventional 
AC power flow equations for a radial distribution 
network.  The formulation of our optimization problem 
representing an AC Optimal Power Flow (AC OPF) is 
listed below.  The time index is omitted for brevity. 
 
 
0 0
0 0, , , , ,minij ij i ij
P Q
P Q P Q l
c P c Q  , (A.1) 
subject to: 
 
 
:
0, ( ) ,Pij ij ij j jk j
k j k
P l r P P j N 

       (A.2.a) 
 
:
0, ( ) ,Qij ij ij j jk j
k j k
Q l x Q Q j N 

       (A.2.b) 
 
2 22( ) ( ) , ,j i ij ij ij ij ij ij ijr P x Q r x l j N          (A.3) 
 
 2 2 , ( , ) ,i ij ij ijl P Q i j E      (A.4) 
 
    min a2 2m x , ,i i i NV iV      (A.5) 
 
  2max , ( , ) ,ij ijl I i j E    (A.6) 
 
where ,ij ijP Q  , and , 0i ijl  . 
The objective function (A.1) represents the cost of 
real and reactive power procured at the root node (i.e., 
at the T&D interface), with Pc  the real power 
Locational Marginal Price (LMP), and Qc  the reactive 
power compensation opportunity cost.  Constraints 
(A.2a) – (A.2b) represent the real and reactive power 
balance at node j ; their associated dual variables 
,j jP Q   denote the real and reactive power DLMPs at 
node j .  Constraints (A.3) and (A.4) define nodal 
voltage and line current.  Constraints (A.5) and (A.6) 
impose voltage and current limits. 
Constraint (A.4) is a convex Second Order Cone 
Programming (SOCP) constraint.  Note that in the 
DistFlow model, constraint (A.4) is an equality 
constraint, hence non-convex.  However, for the cases 
of interest in this work, the relaxation is exact. 
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